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Amid War Strains, Washington and Moscow Experiment With a New Tactic

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The US and Russia are turning to regional partners to advance their interests abroad as weakening multilateral security arrangements give way to narrower partnerships.

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This article was produced by Economy for All, a project of the Independent Media Institute.

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With the US preoccupied with Iran and Russia bogged down in Ukraine, two military operations in different parts of the world seem to be the catalyst for a new method for Washington and Moscow to exert power. Over the last few years, narrower, increased security cooperation and regional maneuvering have emerged as international security arrangements have weakened.

The first example of this regional cooperation was seen in Haiti on October 18 after the kidnapping of four Salvadorans by gangs. El Salvador initially sent 100 special forces soldiers to the Haitian capital, Port-au-Prince, to search and rescue. By October 22, the numbers grew to more than 2,000 troops, according to The Guardian. It was El Salvador’s first independent foreign military campaign since its brief 1969 war with Honduras.

Then, on October 26, Algeria announced plans to send troops to neighboring Niger amid separatist and jihadist activity on its southern border. It marks Algeria’s first major foreign military commitment since the 1973 Yom Kippur War, with the first convoy arriving on October 30.

The near-simultaneous timing and rarity of military campaigns by El Salvador and Algeria are notable. But their work alongside American and Russian security organizations makes these campaigns more significant. In Haiti, the US-based private military and security company (PMSC) Vectus Global has been providing security support to Haitian authorities since early 2025. Niger has hosted Russia’s Africa Corps paramilitary organization since 2024, after it absorbed much of the Wagner PMSC’s former African network.

While PMSCs and paramilitary forces often operate within multilateral alliances, Washington and Moscow have established independent security footholds in Haiti and Niger, respectively, through these organizations. Vectus Global and the Africa Corps, however, have limited manpower and now appear to be turning to El Salvador and Algeria, respectively, to reinforce their operations. This provides the US and Russia with additional military support while allowing them to maintain some degree of distance from the deployments.

These simultaneous campaigns come amid a weakening of global multilateral security arrangements in recent years. Shortcomings of UN peacekeeping, breakdown in the Western alliance, and questions about globalization’s future have created space for smaller, more selective partnerships. But El Salvador and Algeria are not simply following Washington’s and Moscow’s lead. Haiti and Niger will also seek to protect their own sovereignty and national interests, potentially complicating these partnerships over time.

The Caribbean Cauldron

After former Haitian President Jovenel Moïse’s assassination in 2021, US and Salvadoran efforts to restore security gradually converged. In the aftermath, Haiti requested US military assistance. However, despite concerns that instability could trigger a refugee crisis and create opportunities for organized crime, the Biden administration declined to intervene directly, instead backing a UN security force led by Kenya in 2023.

As instability worsened, Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele offered to help. In 2024, Bukele said that while a UN Security Council resolution was required, El Salvador could “eliminate” Haiti’s gangs by using his domestic anti-gang policies, which he has credited with making El Salvador the safest country in the Americas.

Under the second Trump administration, these efforts coalesced. In early 2025, the US State Department authorized Vectus Global to export defense services to Haiti, permitting military-related work there. Founded by Trump ally Erik Prince, the company secured a 10-year contract to improve security by combating gangs and strengthening Haiti’s customs framework. Since March 2025, Vectus Global personnel have conducted drone strikes and helicopter attacks in Haiti, provided combat training, and supplied hundreds of fighters. Small Wars Journal describes the campaign as one in which “contracted mercenaries are engaging in legally questionable activities to stave off violent armed gangs from taking over full control of the capital Port-au-Prince.”

Meanwhile, Erik Prince’s ties to El Salvador predated Trump’s reelection. In August 2024, he visited El Salvador and proposed using their existing prison complex for migrants. In 2025, he registered an LLC called 2USV in Wyoming and shared his proposed plan with the White House when Trump took power. The proposal would have put Prince’s company in charge of managing logistics for the prisons, including transporting detainees from American holding cells to El Salvador’s prison, according to Politico. Prince’s proposal, however, showed no signs of progress. The Trump administration, meanwhile, deported migrants to El Salvador prisons as part of its own operations.

While Prince’s “prison plan” might have fallen through, Salvadorans comprise a large part of Vectus Global’s personnel in Haiti.

El Salvador has also strengthened official military cooperation with Washington before its deployment to Haiti. It received shipments of US rifles and helicopters throughout 2025, followed by additional firearms, medical supplies, and helicopter maintenance equipment from US Southern Command in 2026. In April, the two countries also cohosted the multinational military exercise CENTAM Guardian 26.

El Salvador’s October move into Haiti received Washington’s approval, and the US “provided C-130 transport aircraft to help move Salvadoran troops to Haiti,” a US military official told Reuters. The buildup indicates the deployment was planned well in advance, and the US, El Salvador, and Haiti each have reasons to see it through.

For Washington, the mission supports the Trump administration’s effort to reassert US influence in the Americas. Haiti overlooks important Caribbean shipping routes, has potential for port and infrastructure development, and has lucrative mining resources. Once security is restored, Vectus Global plans to implement a customs program collecting duties on goods crossing Haiti’s border with the Dominican Republic, further entrenching US influence. The transitional government in Haiti is also supporting Vectus, having “chosen a more direct path—turning to Prince and Vectus rather than awaiting the results of yet another experiment in multilateralism,” according to an opinion piece on the University of Miami School of Law’s website.

Bukele, meanwhile, can promote his security model abroad, expand El Salvador’s regional influence, and strengthen ties with Washington. Following the struggles of the UN-led mission and Vectus Global to restore order in Haiti, an estimated 6.4 million people needed humanitarian aid at the start of 2026, according to the nonprofit organization Cordaid. Haiti’s government has little choice but to look beyond the approaches that have already failed.

The UN rebranded its mission in Haiti as the Gang Suppression Force in September 2025, and has distanced itself from El Salvador’s operation. On November 3, the UN announced that it had received a request from a major Haitian gang leader calling for international mediation, with the Salvadoran troops escalating their actions against criminal groups. In the days that followed, a drone strike killed Boston gang leader Mathias Saintil operating in Haiti. In another operation, the Haitian police, along with Salvadoran forces, destroyed a house used by the 400 Mawozo leader Wilson Joseph, suggesting the offensive against Haiti’s gang continues to intensify.

Niger and Wider Sahel Instability

Niger has similarly faced years of growing instability from separatist and jihadist groups. It expelled French and US forces in 2023 and 2024, respectively, turning instead to Russia’s Wagner group and later the Africa Corps, which absorbed much of Wagner’s African operations. Since October 30, Algerian forces have guarded infrastructure and supported Niger’s security efforts, helping relieve pressure on the Africa Corps.

Russia and Algeria also took time to develop their current security relationship. Russia’s private military networks expanded across Africa during the 2010s, most notably through Wagner, which secured contracts for political influence and access to natural resources.

Wagner expanded into the Sahel in 2021, marked by its arrival in Mali. Subsequently, military coups and deteriorating relations between countries in the region and Western governments led to the withdrawal of Western forces from Mali, Burkina Faso, and later Niger. Despite Algeria’s longstanding military ties with Russia, Wagner’s growing presence and struggle to contain regional violence have worried Algiers.

After Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune visited Russia in June 2023, the two nations signed the Declaration on Enhanced Strategic Partnership. Wagner’s rebellion during the same month and the death of its founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, in August accelerated Kremlin efforts to bring the organization under state control. Over the following months, much of its African operations reorganized into the Africa Corps, making it “more manageable and less associated with the controversial Prigozhin,” according to the Jamestown Foundation.

Managed by Russian military intelligence, the Africa Corps’ operations draw on Russian state personnel, former Wagner fighters, and other PMSC personnel, according to the Congressional Research Service. Its structure also allows the Russian Defense Ministry to contract a “variety of organizations” and individuals, RUSI senior research fellow Antonio Giustozzi told the UK’s House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee in 2025, as the organization expanded its presence in the Sahel.

But the 2025 Algerian break with the Alliance of Sahel States—a 2023 security pact between Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso—complicated Russia’s regional ambitions. Moscow aims to build a stronger military presence, secure access to the region’s natural resources, and expand its political influence at the expense of Western powers. Algeria’s rift with its southern neighbors, however, made it harder for Moscow to use its ties with Algeria to strengthen its position in the Sahel.

The AES has increasingly deepened military ties with Russia, and Moscow has sought to mend relations between the alliance and Algiers, mediating a diplomatic reset in July. Russia also strengthened military ties with Algeria through a growing stream of military-linked cargo flights, alongside official deliveries of long-range bombers and the first export of its Su-57E fighter jet in early 2026. Defense News, calling Algeria an “important Russian ally at Europe’s southern flank,” added that Moscow was “using the country as a hub to project Russia’s power deeper into Africa.”

Russia and Algeria have cooperated in Niger before their October deployment. In August, Algeria sent fighter jets and air-to-air refueling planes to secure Nigerien airspace during an attempted coup, while Russian Africa Corps personnel supported troops on the ground along with providing aerial support. Algerian aircraft used Niger’s Air Base 101 in Niamey, the country’s main military outpost and an Africa Corps base.

Algeria and Niger also share a growing inventory of Russian-origin military equipment. In August, Algeria transferred four helicopters from its own arsenal to Niger, further connecting their armed forces.

Algeria’s decision to deploy its forces in October was viewed favorably in Moscow, but Algiers is pursuing its own interests. Algerian officials have said that the deployment aims to protect the country’s energy and economic interests in Niger, particularly those of state oil and gas company Sonatrach. These include the proposed Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline, which would carry Nigerian gas through Niger and Algeria to European markets.

Russia’s Africa Corps has nonetheless gained additional military support from Algerian forces, while Niger has secured a powerful regional partner in its efforts to restore stability.

A New Model of Intervention

It’s unclear whether Washington and Moscow tacitly accommodated each other’s plans, but the movement of personnel and equipment, alongside diplomatic signals, suggests both were aware of the other’s intentions. Neither Washington nor Moscow has openly challenged the other’s military operations yet, and both may tolerate them as long as they remain limited and don’t threaten the other country’s interests.

The joint deployments of private/paramilitary forces and individual national militaries point to a new way for major and regional powers to extend their military influence abroad, as multilateral security arrangements weaken and narrower partnerships gain importance. Coordinating the interests and activities of multiple governments and security organizations will be difficult, however, and success in one country does not guarantee it in the other. Algeria, for example, has far greater autonomy than El Salvador given its larger population and economy and distance from Russia’s sphere of influence, leaving Moscow with less influence over its partner than Washington has over its own.

While El Salvador and Algeria could enhance their positions and strengthen ties with Washington and Moscow, they may ultimately be left carrying the burden if the arrangements fail. Haiti and Niger, meanwhile, could see their instability worsen.

Yet for relatively little direct commitment, Washington and Russia can extend their reach while limiting political costs, diplomatic fallout, and responsibility for abuses by forces operating on the ground. David Alpher, a US Army veteran and humanitarian adviser and conflict specialist, now with the grassroots organization Aid on the Hill, tells me that “the companies are coming because there’s some resource profit involved. They’ll say, ‘We’ll take care of your counterterrorism problem, but we want preferential access to basic rights, overflight rights, mineral rights, whatever.’”

Combining these operations with national military deployments makes the underlying agreements difficult to untangle. As Alpher notes, “with a formal military arrangement, that’s comparatively transparent. Not everything will be public, and some of it will be classified, but these corporate arrangements are completely opaque,” and “nobody knows who signed up to what or what the trade-offs were. Once they’re in, you’re not getting rid of them very quickly.”

Success could encourage other countries to pursue similar partnerships, where the risk of overlapping operations will grow—Russian and US private military companies have operated in the same country before, with Vectus Global and Africa Corps both currently operating in the Democratic Republic of Congo. For Washington and Moscow, using these organizations may limit their exposure, but it will not limit the consequences.

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RELEASED FOR SYNDICATION:
November 16, 2026
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